

EXHIBIT No. 62

I. *General.*—The meeting was called at the Information Center on Monday, 24 November, for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment might be needed to do so.

Those present were:

Colonel Murphy-----	Acting Signal Officer, HHD
Lt. Comdr. Coe-----	Patrol Wing Two
Major Tindal-----	18th Bombardment Wing
Lt. Comdr. Taylor-----	U. S. Navy
Capt. Bergquist-----	14th Pursuit Wing
Lt. White-----	Signal Corps, Hawaiian Dept.
Lt. Harville-----	53rd Coast Artillery
Lt. Thomas-----	86th Obs. Sq. (Support Command)

The following points were discussed and generally agreed upon:

a. *Function of the Information Center:* It was agreed that Information Center, properly organized and run, would continually have complete information of all activities in the Hawaiian area, and that this information, properly disseminated, would be of great value to all military, naval and civilian activities, at the present time, during actual state of war, and during attacks on the island. It was further agreed that in order to obtain and disseminate all information, a very close liaison between all activities must be maintained, and that liaison watch officers from each activity would have to be trained and present at the Information Center.

In this connection it was pointed out that it would not be the function of the Information Center to order various activities (other than Pursuit Aviation) to carry out particular operations, but rather to give information and warning of imminent hostile raids to these activities so that they might take immediate action according to prearranged plan. As all information is immediately and visually available to all liaison officers, it would be their duty to pass the pertinent information on to their respective units. The duty Controller will be the representative of the Commanding General, Interceptor Command. His primary duty will be the direction of Pursuit activities, and he will act as coordinator of information when this is necessary.

b. *Facilities:* Although considerable equipment is on order and planned for the operation of the Information Center, this equipment will not be available for some time to come; it is obvious, therefore, that every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by proper coordination of all various military, naval and civilian activities. It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks.

Information would have to be drawn from the following sources:

Detector Stations.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Intelligence Service (a) GLRDF; (b) Observation Posts (Artillery).

[2] (5) Naval Aircraft, ships and stations.

(6) Lighthouses.

(7) Coast Guard.

(8) Army and Naval Intelligence.

(9) Bomber Command.

(10) Support Command.

(11) Civilian Agencies (PAA, Inter-Island, CAA, Police and civilians through Police).

(12) Civilian Air Raid Warning Service.

c. *Operations.*—(1) At the present time, the Information Center is operating from 0700 to 1130. It is desired to operate the Information Center on a full-time daily basis (0600 to 1800) as early as possible, and eventually, when personnel can be made available, on a 24-hour basis. An estimate of the number of personnel required to man the positions will be studied. It was decided that the following watch officers should man the Information Center at all times, in the numbers required to keep a continuous watch:

(a) Controller

(b) Pursuit Officer

(c) Gun Control Officer

(d) Naval Air liaison Officer (including Coast Guard)

(e) Naval Surface Liaison (including Coast Guard)

(f) Bomber Command

- (g) Support Command
- (h) Department G-2 Liaison
- (i) CAA Liaison
- (j) CARW Officer
- (k) RDF Officer
- (l) Communications Officer

(2) It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the above watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. It is felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.

(3) It is realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It is therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands will be trained.

(4) It was brought out that the Naval Liaison Officer now assigned to the Information Center is attached to Patrol Wing Two. This is not a permanently shore-based unit, and therefore liaison personnel from Patrol Wing Two might be withdrawn at any time, leaving the Information Center without trained Naval Liaison. It is therefore suggested that the Commandant, 14th Naval District be approached with a view to obtaining naval liaison officers and coordinating the information for all naval activities, shore and afloat.

[3] (5) As the present mobile RDF equipment is not all that might be hoped for, it was agreed that the AA RDF might be tied in. This would permit information on heights of incoming raids sufficiently far from the coast to make interceptions. The AAA RDF equipment is already being tied in with the Information Center for this purpose.

(6) It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises has been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the islands at all times; however, after discussion it was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:

(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their operations rooms.

(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.

(c) By requiring all planes approaching the island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before coming in.

In this connection it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.

(7) The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the island were friend or foe. It would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all RDF frequencies; it was therefore decided that this is not a reliable solution for some time to come.

(8) It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible. Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear; however, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy; this was held to be no obstacle, as the information Center should be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.

(9) The question of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

(10) It was decided that in order to avoid dangerous time discrepancies, the Information Center should synchronize its clocks with the U. S. Navy time, and that all other clocks should be synchronized with the Information Center.

[4] Clocks will be synchronized to the second, and all times will be reported to the minute within the nearest 30 seconds.

(11) It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other army, navy, coast guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.

(12) In view of the permanence of its location and operation on the island, and its bombproof position, the question was raised as to whether or not it might be important to use the Information Center as a joint Communications Center, or to have a joint Communications Center adjacent to the Information Center.

(13) The question of teletypes was brought up, and it was considered that in some cases it might be used to advantage but in most cases it was too slow. Direct lines should therefore be used between all manned positions in the Information Center and the various outlying units.

(14) As there has been some difficulty in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits to the Information Center, i. e., requests had to be made by each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits—this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center. Circuits to Kaneohe and Bellows Field are required, and Colonel Murphy agreed that these could be furnished.

(15) It was agreed that all air to ground and air to ship radio procedure, of Fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics Navy Department letter to this effect, it is believed that all naval Fighter squadrons are now using the British system. It was decided, therefore, that all Pursuit squadrons will also use this procedure. It was felt by all that further liaison should be done to insure that the procedure being used is the same.

(16) It was decided that Intercept Tables for use in interceptions are cumbersome and unnecessary, and that therefore interceptions would be accomplished by eye, direct from RDF plots, by the Controller or Pursuit Officer.

(17) It was considered desirable to point out to all aircraft activities that homing and rescue facilities are being made available to all aircraft within the next fourteen days. It was decided that the question of developing this to the highest degree would be worked out with the activities concerned. It was felt that if all information comes in to the Information Center, the Information Center could, with the minimum amount of delay, locate aircraft in distress and send out rescue aircraft or surface craft to the proper position.

(18) It was pointed out also that the Information Center can be used for dissemination of orders, change of policy, or recalling aircraft, immediately, through Information Center direct lines, when this is desired by the Officers commanding the particular activities.

(19) It was decided that communications liaison is vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.

(d) It was decided to investigate the probability and possibility of using naval ship-board RDF (RADAR) to supplement the land-based RDF under various conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.

(e) The facilities of the Information Center can be made available to Army, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons for interception, exercises, by arrangement either by telephone or letter to the Controller, Information Center.

Certified a true copy:

R. D. Powers

R. D. POWERS,

Lt-Comdr., USNR.,

Counsel for Judge Advocate.

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT G3

Exhibit G3 is a file of photostatic copies of certain dispatches, duly authenticated under official seal, prepared by the Acting Director of Naval Communications at the request of the Judge Advocate.

This exhibit has, by direction of the court, been filed separately with that part of the record which has been extracted and separately deposited with the Secretary of the Navy. This action was taken in the interest of the National security and the successful prosecution of the war.

H. B. HITCHCOCK,

Captain U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

(See Vol. IV of Exhibits for copy of Top Secret Exhibit G3.)